Figure 1 Major types of audit
In advanced DBlDC systems, more manual processes and appli-IN PROCESS POST.PROCESS cations will be computerized. The audit support must be com-I mensurate with the support to automate new processes. Otherwise, the inability to audit will limit new applications from being Also, in advanced systems, commitments will be made more at terminals using on-line data, rather than after verification of the results of a batch run. This means that the audit function, e.g., recording of audit trails, the verification-of-results function, etc., must be system-supported to the same level as the dependency being placed on the on-line data by the terminal user.
Finally, in advanced systems, the sequence of processes interacting with the data base is less repeatable in an on-line interactive environment than in a batch environment. This sequence is due to the random arrival of incoming transactions rather than the preplanned processing sequence typical of batch processing. Therefore, a generalized audit trail facility must be provided that tracks data usage and captures the unrepeatable sequence of processes during the execution of the process itself.
Aspects of auditing types
Four major types of audit are of interest for advanced DWDC of systems as shown in Figure 1 . In-process signifies that the moniaudit toring of the application and verification for adherence to specified rules are performed while the process being audited is in execution. Post-process signifies that the recording of the audit trail is performed concurrently with the process to be audited, but the audit itself is performed after completion of the process. Transparent or not signifies whether the process to be audited is aware of the audit.
The four types of audit as seen in Figure 1 each have the following characteristics.
A1 is where the audit is being performed in real time transparently to the on-going process being audited. Examples of A1 are: (1) the auditor introduces test transactions into the system and verifies the process being audited by analyzing the outputs based on specific inputs, (2) two asynchronous processes with one monitoring the other at defined audit points, and ( 3 ) full interpretation with the audit process being the interpreter of the process being audited.
A characteristic of A1 is that the audit function, in addition to being transparent to the on-going process, does not alter the course of the process. That is, the audit is usually not in-line with the day-to-day accounting practices of running the enterprise. If an in-process audit finds a violation of accounting practices, the usual procedure is not to stop the audited process but rather to have the person or group responsible for the erring process fix it and then issue adjustments to the incorrect outputs.
Additionally, A1 has the characteristic of not requiring an audit trail (not for audit purposes but may require one for other purposes) since the auditing function is performed in-process.
A2 is an "after-the-fact" audit in which a process or person looks back in time at the effects, actions, algorithms, etc., of an earlier process. This type requires a recording of a great deal more information than an audit may actually require and use since all the earlier processing is rarely audited. A sampling technique usually chooses which subset to actually audit out of all recorded data.
A3 is an in-line audit of the application's process. What audit rules, when to apply them, and their results must be preplanned as part of the application. A3 is different from A 1 in that the audit rules in A3 cannot be changed without reprogramming the process. An example of A3 is the application displaying certain data (to an auditor) when a specific transaction type or instance is encountered.
A4 is the case of the process to be audited explicitly saving what is required for an audit of the process later in time. A4 is typically used in the debugging mode in which the debug tools (e.g., trace, storage dumps, etc.) are invoked in-line for analysis later in time. The data saved may also be used for recovery purposes such as determining what the initial values were during process execution.
In developing general audit trail concepts, certain assumptions

DB/DC
were made regarding the audit environment of advanced DB/DC audit systems. These assumptions are summarized below. assumptions 1. Auditing application systems must be permitted by the following classes of objects: (a) application transaction levels (where one level may be nested within a higher level), (b) procedure, (c) data type-fields, records, files, (d) user, (e) terminal, and (f) any Boolean combination of the above. 2. The auditor requires the system to retain for addressability later in time (after process completion) the following (maximal case): (a) identity of transaction by occurrence, (b) name and version of procedure, (c) name and version of (i.e., use for the purpose of making a decision) by another 13. The installation must be able to control or choose between cost/performance tradeoffs for functional support of the detection and recording of audit events and information.
Definition of an audit trail
I
The preceding discussion has sought to present the environment and requirements of a generalized audit trail for advanced DBlDC systems. This section defines and characterizes such an audit trail.
Our definition of an audit trail is: A history of activities by transaction, posted because of operations on specific data: operations are those functions that are defined as events (via transparent event descriptors) to be noted in the audit trail as a consequence of a particular interaction with the data base. For example, operations might be updates as is required for simple backout or may include references to data as well to be used for scoping the bounds of propagated errors (see Reference 2). An audit trail concept adds the time dimension as a third coordinate to Figure 2 . Figure 3 shows the time dimension with the "now" values being the closest to the origin and prior values (versions) going chronologically back through time as one traverses the time coordinate. To locate a unique value, an (i, j , k ) coordinate must be specified where i is the field name (assumed unique through all versions of values), j is the unique stored record identifier (also assumed unique through time), and k is the point in time for the desired value. If, in addition, supple-I of the first-level audit trail (the activities "now" against the "then" now values).
The underscore linkage from the "now" value, 12, to the t, audit trail entry is required to provide addressability to the supplemental information recorded when x was updated to 12. In other words, the head of the push-down stack shows activity on a prior generation of x , not the "now" value.
The motivation of having the "now" value be a separate part of the audit trail is to provide compatibility with today's data set formats. Also, the content is selected by the data base administrator. The audit trail may reside on different devices and be accessed by different access methods compared with the "now" values.
E. Update a prior generation of x -Update x(t,)
to 25 at time t4. This is the case of updating an earlier generation of x when an error has been detected "after the fact."
The t, audit trail entry now indicates that the update to x at t, has been superseded by the t, entry.
At least two cases of error propagation are apparent. The first involves a blind fix wherein the value of the record or field is changed as specified independently of subsequent usage. The second case is an application-dependent repair to later-generation values-such as adding the increment 13 to all generations of x after t,.
It is the responsibility of the user of the audit trail interface to take the necessary corrective action to repair later values and determine who depended on the incorrect values. The "who" is omitted in this example.
The security controls required to prevent unauthorized usage of the audit trail are assumed to exist but not addressed in this paper.
The problem that now arises is: who gets to see either the uncorrected version of x at time t, or the logically updated version of x at time t, as it should have been at time t,? The auditor or person using the audit trail for debugging purposes may want to see the real history of activities. Otherwise, an application program may want the logically correct value at time t, ( x = 2 5 ) . One 1 way of solving this potential ambiguity (which has always existed) is to have a "user intent" code in the interface denoting intended audit trail usage of this particular user.
F. Concept ofa curofperiod-A cutoff period is a distinct realtime interval in the time-ordered sequence of audit trail entries that has been useful to record in a catalog. The time intervals may be ( rz, to) and ( r4, r3) in the above example (e.g., tz = April 1, to = January 1). The cutoff periods will generally be chosen to coincide with some legal or accounting date requirements such as end-of-month or end-of-year. A cutoff period permits the user/system to have multiple entry points to the time-ordered sequence of audit trail entries. Without a cutoff period concept, a sequential scan is implied from the latest activity of the field serially back through time through all preceding activities until the desired field generation is found. A cutoff period concept implies better performance by permitting the user/system to choose the cutoff period entry point to the audit trail that is later than and nearest to the desired earlier value.
A cutoff period is also useful in the area of data purging and reduction. A simple purging algorithm might be to purge all audit trail entries that are more than y years old, or created prior to cutoff period 3. Or the data might be summarized such as average quantity-on-hand for the cutoff period 3. Purging is the process of deleting audit trail entries and making their contents no longer addressable under system control.
(This is probably a data reduction operation with the original data being retained for x years).
A problem with the cutoff period concept is that operations such as update in one cutoff period may be logically superseded later in another cutoff period. Case E, above, is such an example. One discovers later what the then "now" value should have been. One cannot simply go to that desired cutoff period and start searching backward for the desired update (for example) since a later cutoff period contains the logically corrected value which, in turn, may have been still later superseded, etc. Each cutoff period must be able, therefore, to have an indication of whether its audit trail entries have been corrected logically in a later cutoff period-and possibly which entry in which later cutoff period.
Content and format tradeoffs of an audit trail
This section examines the detailed parts of an audit trail entry audit and some of the format considerations and attendant tradeoffs.
trail
Following is a list of candidates that have been identified as being entry useful or required to be recorded in the audit trail.
I
The name of the data being operated upon. Whether or not the name of the data is recorded explicitly in the audit trail is a function of the naming convention and scope of the audit trail entries. The naming convention assumed in this paper is that the data name remains constant for all versions of its values. If the audit trail has a scope of many data sets and the same field can appear in more than one data set, then obviously at least a twolevel naming scheme is required (e.g., data set name, field name). Both data set and field name can be factored out of each audit trail entry and placed into a dictionary. The dictionary would contain descriptive information, constant across a cutoff period, such as data name, representation, version, etc., needed to fully interpret the audit trail entries. In reality, an audit trail is also needed on the dictionary to track name changes and synonyms of a field.
Not addressed in this paper are the problems of a data name being changed (or deleted) between generations, synonyms, and how to know which name to use in the first place (as well as what it means).
The new value after the operation. The new value is recorded after the operation (as defined in the audit trail event descriptor). The value prior to the operation is available as the prior operation's result. One possibility is that the prior value and the new operation are recorded in the same audit trail entry, thereby making the prior value immediately addressable. This gives high-performance capability to the data restore of the original value at the expense of redundancy of the value in the audit trail.
Operation causing audit trail entry. This operation is the recording of what interaction with the data caused the entry to be made in the audit trail. Those that are ready candidates are as follows: (a) Create or insert new data, (b) Delete data, (c) Update, (d) Reference data for the purpose of commitment (using this data as the basis of future actions), and (e) References for any reason (such as debugging purposes).
Time stamp. The actual time that the given operation occurs is recorded. The granularity of the time stamp must be fine enough so that no two operations have the same time stamp. Otherwise, the real sequence of operations is not guaranteed reproducible.
The representation. The format of the field at the time of the operation upon the value is possibly recorded. This provides the capability of being able to change the field representation from one version to the next. The audit trail interface could permit viewing prior values through the "now" value's descriptor (current representation of the field). Therefore, a possible format 238
